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Abstract
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ence between different income groups and the Council reveals that while the poor are systematically underrepresented,
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1. Introduction
At the core of any political regime stands the relation-
ship between political and economic power. In Aristotle’s
Politics, the pioneering comparative study of political sys-
tems, Aristotle (384–322 BC) observed that an Athenian
citizen under a democratic regime would not classify as
such under an oligarchic regime and that the key dif-
ference between democracy and oligarchy was poverty
and wealth (Aristotle’s Politics, 1280a, as translated
by Moschovis, 1989). Aristotle considered both democ-
racy and oligarchy to be ‘corrupt’ regimes since neither
served the preferences and interests of the whole soci-
ety: While the poor dominated in democracy, oligarchy
served only the interests of the wealthy. For this rea-
son, in Aristotle’s view, power should lie with the mid-
dle class. In contemporary representative government,
citizens’ views and opinions are channeled through pro-
fessional party politicians who are expected to represent
them and voice their concerns to various political institu-
tions. This type of regime does not allow for the direct
participation of citizens in political decision-making, and
hence it is impossible for the poor to dominate. What
about the wealthy, however?
Under representative government, the ballot con-
cerns a choice between predefined policy directions, and
in theory everybody’s ballot has equal weight irrespec-
tive of income, and representatives should consider all
citizens’ preferences equally. However, there are rea-
sons why representatives might neglect the views of the
poor and/or cater to the rich. To begin with, deputies
by definition do not belong to the lowest social strata;
quite the contrary, as being a deputy comes with sev-
eral economic and political privileges. Since the poor
tend to turn out to vote in smaller numbers (Gallego,
2007; Lijphart, 1997), moreover, their limited participa-
tion may affect the outcome in ways disadvantageous
for them. Furthermore, income may play a role in stages
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of the political process preceding or following the ballot:
For instance, the rich can influence the policy agenda
and direction through legal and/or illegal means such
as the financing of party campaigns, or attempts to cor-
rupt party politicians (see, for example, Rosset, Giger,
& Bernauer, 2013). Alternatively, the rich can block pol-
icymaking that threatens their interests; for example,
big businesses faced with increases in taxes or wages
may threaten to relocate production to countries with
cheaper labor and lower taxes.
This raises the question of whether and to what ex-
tent the poor are well represented by contemporary
democratic political institutions, especially in compari-
son to the rich. A growing literature on unequal repre-
sentation of income groups in the US documents that cit-
izens from the poorer income strata are less well repre-
sented and their voices less likely to be heard byUS politi-
cians (Bartels, 2008; Gilens, 2005; Kelly & Enns, 2010;
Soroka & Wlezien, 2008; Ura & Ellis, 2008). Recent re-
search on unequal representation in a large number of
European countries finds similar trends (e.g., Donnelly &
Lefkofridi, 2014; Giger, Rosset, & Bernauer, 2012).
A large majority of these European countries are
members of the EU, however, and in such a multilevel
polity as the EU wealthy citizens may have more in-
fluence over policy simply because they have more re-
sources to invest in lobbying actors at different levels of
governance, including not only national political party or-
ganizations and national governments but also EU insti-
tutions. Surprisingly, however, very little is known about
unequal representation at EU level. Studies on EU repre-
sentation have focused quite narrowly on the European
Parliament (EP) and have largely neglected the Council
(though, see Hagemann, Hobolt, & Wratil, 2017). We ar-
gue that this is an unsatisfactory state of the art and that
we need to compare and contrast potentially unequal
representation in the EP to the same phenomenon in its
counterpart, i.e., the Council.
Ignoring the question of unequal representation at
EU level is highly problematic for several reasons. From
the outset the EU promoted economic integration among
European states, including the opening of borders,market
liberalization, and economic competition, which in turn
has created new cleavages of winners and losers within
European publics, i.e., between those able to engage in
and benefit from these processes and those who cannot
(Kriesi et al., 2006; see also Fligstein, 2008). Economic in-
tegration has additionally exacerbated income inequality
within member states by impacting their welfare states
and by undermining the position of labor through the
pressures of international wage and employment compe-
tition (Beckfield, 2006). At the peak of theGreat Recession
in 2008, the direction of the EU’s economic policy decided
on by the Council (i.e., austerity, including budget and
wage cuts) tended to hurt middle- and low-income citi-
zens rather than thewealthy across the EU. Thus, unequal
representation may also concern specific income groups
within member states and/or across the EU.
The question thus arises as to whether EU institu-
tions represent poor Europeans less well than they rep-
resent the rich. In this article we tackle this question by
examining the two major channels of representation in
policy-making at EU level, using empirical evidence re-
garding the unequal representation of income groups.
On the one hand, the EP is the only EU-level body whose
composition can be determined directly by the European
people and the only supranational institution with a
clear mandate of citizen representation; it is also the
only supranational institution where citizens’ represen-
tatives sit according to party-ideological rather than na-
tional/territorial lines.
On the other hand, the Council brings together
‘sovereigns.’ In fact, there are two types of Council. First
there is the European Council, which is the top-level po-
litical configuration of heads of states and governments
of the EUmember states and which defines the most im-
portant policy issues and determines the political direc-
tion of the entire Union. Second, there is the Council of
Ministers, which meets for the purpose of legislation in
ten different policy-related configurations of the 28 min-
istries of themember states. Herewe treat both as a ‘uni-
fied’ political body of the Union, hereafter referred to
as the ‘Council’ or ‘EU Council,’ since individual Council
members, whether they be presidents, prime ministers
or ministers, enjoy territorially-bound democratic legiti-
macy for their actions. Scrutinizing the Council is partic-
ularly important given that, prior to the Lisbon Treaty of
2007, the Council was the main legislator with the high-
est decision-making competences.
This study contributes to the scant literature analyz-
ing the EU Council in terms of political representation
(Hagemann et al., 2017) and is the first to examine the
unequal representation of income groups in EU institu-
tions. In pursuit of these goals, we study the degree
of ideological congruence, which is a very useful indi-
cator of alignment between publics and policymakers.
Congruence constitutes an important prerequisite for cit-
izens’ ‘substantive’ representation in the policymaking
process (Mansbridge, 2009; Pitkin, 1967): If publics and
their representatives diverge greatly, it is unlikely that
the latter will include the public in policy-making pro-
cesses. In this study we examine the ideological congru-
ence between poor and rich Europeans with regard to
two key EU institutions over a ten-year period. We are
thus able to uncover important facets of representation
and to document for the first time the degree of inequal-
ity that exists in representing citizens at EU level.
2. Citizens’ Representation at EU level
Thomassen and Schmitt (1997; Schmitt & Thomassen,
1999) have long argued for a distinction to be drawn be-
tween two different channels of representation of citi-
zens’ preferences at EU level. There is one direct channel
of influence via the EP, which operates through the selec-
tion of (national) party candidates to represent citizens
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in the Parliament. The second channel is indirect and
operates through the participation of national govern-
ments in the EU Council. While this distinction is widely
recognized, empirical research has fallen short in analyz-
ing these two channels of representation simultaneously.
In fact, empirical research on the topic has mainly fo-
cused on representation via the direct channel of the EP
(see, for example, Lefkofridi, 2020; Costello, Thomassen,
& Rosema, 2012; Lefkofridi & Katsanidou, 2014; Mattila
& Raunio, 2012). These studies generally suggest that EP
representation works quite well on the left–right dimen-
sion but less well for European integration-related topics
(see, for example, Costello et al., 2012). Research on the
indirect channel is scarce, though a recent exception is
Hagemann et al. (2017), who show that decision-making
in the Council is influenced by citizens’ opinions: For ex-
ample, when domestic electorates are skeptical about
the EU their governments are more likely to oppose leg-
islation aimed at deepening European integration. On
the other hand, Alexandrova, Rasmussen, and Toshkov
(2016) have shown how citizens’ priorities play a role in
determining the amount of attention certain topics are
given by the Council.
To date, however, no study has examined whether
representation is equally good for different societal
groups, e.g., differentiated by income. This is quite re-
markable given that several strands of research suggest
economic and political inequality to be related to each
other (e.g., Lefkofridi, Giger, & Kissau, 2012). First, the sig-
nificant negative effect of income inequality on turnout
is consistent both across and within countries (Schäfer &
Schwander, 2019). Moreover, the poor participate less in
democratic elections at both national and European lev-
els (Gallego, 2015; Mattila, 2003). One reason why the
poor tend to participate less in democratic elections is
the well-established relationship between income and
education, which in turn impacts upon political knowl-
edge. In such a complex multilevel and transnational sys-
tem of governance as the EU, political knowledge has
been shown to matter in regard to turning out to vote
in European elections (Braun & Tausendpfund, 2019).
Second, research on representation shows that the
poor are not well represented in either the US or in
Europe. Studies that have examined responsiveness in
the US, (i.e., focusing on the question of how citi-
zens’ preferences are mirrored in public policy) have
found that when the preferences of rich and poor di-
verge, the views of the affluent will count more (e.g.,
Bartels, 2008; Gilens, 2012; Gilens & Page, 2014). This
holds also for the subnational level (see, for example,
Flavin, 2012). Similar findings emerge from studies fo-
cusing on a diverse set of European countries, includ-
ing relatively developed and rich states such as Sweden
(Persson & Gilljam, 2019), Germany (Elsässer, Hense,
& Schäfer, 2017) and the Netherlands (Schakel, 2019).
Besides these case studies, comparative research has
also revealed that congruence between citizens and pol-
icymakers is often tilted towards the more affluent in
European societies (e.g., Peters & Ensink, 2015; Rosset
et al., 2013; Schakel & Hakhverdian, 2018). On the ba-
sis of national-level evidence from both sides of the
Atlantic, therefore, unequal representation seems to be
a widespread phenomenon.
These findings beg the question of whether and to
what extent a similar phenomenon is present when it
comes to the representation of less affluent citizens at
EU level. Themechanisms that drive unequal representa-
tion listed in the current literature, e.g., the poorer strata
turning out in lower percentages or the more affluent
using their financial means to influence policy via cam-
paign donation or lobbying, seem equally relevant at EU
level as they are at the national level. Accordingly, we
aim to fill this research gap by examining how unequal
income groups are represented both by the EP and by
the EU Council.
3. Research Design
In order to tackle the general question of the poten-
tially unequal representation of citizens’ preferences by
EU institutions, we proceed in two steps. Our first goal
is to trace the evolution of the income groups’ posi-
tions over time and examine their congruence with the
two key institutions. In the context of political repre-
sentation, the term ‘congruence’ (which connotes agree-
ment, harmony, or compatibility between two entities)
is a criterion for assessing whether representation works
(Lefkofridi, in press), since comparing citizens’ opinions
with the opinions of those who make policy on their
behalf helps assess the ‘democratic’ character of polit-
ical representation (Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2012,
p. 87). In this step of the analysis, we study income group
representation at the level of the EU-wide citizenry who
are affected by the decisions made by the Council and
the EP. To be clear, if the preferences of the poor and the
rich do not differ, then even if representatives disregard
the poor there is no problem regarding democratic repre-
sentation. However, research shows that onmany issues,
and especially on the issue of economic redistribution,
the preferences of the poor and the rich differ systemati-
cally (e.g., Donnelly & Lefkofridi, 2014; Giger et al., 2012),
at least at national level.
Our second goal is to take a closer look at the Council,
which represents citizens clustered in member states. In
essence, the Council as a whole can be conceived of as
a political body in which representatives of all member
states come together to decide about common policy
for the EU as a whole while at the same time seeking
to ensure that domestic preferences are promoted (or
at the very least do not jeopardize those preferences).
Conceived thus, each member of the Council would
make efforts not to diverge from the position of their na-
tional constituency. However, the ways in which domes-
tic preferences are defined differ according to the ide-
ological composition of the government in place—and
some governmentsmay be closer to the poor/richwithin
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their national constituencies. Considering this additional
type of congruence not only helps to answer questions
about national-territorial representation in the Council,
i.e., of each member state separately, but also helps us
to ascertain whether the EU-wide pattern regarding the
representation of the poor/rich also holds if we disaggre-
gate the EU into its members. This step helps examine
whether the findings based on the aggregate picture are
replicated atmember-state level and ensures that the EU-
wide pattern does not mask a skewed distribution of un-
equal representation.
To answer our research question, we use existing
data gathered from both mass and elite levels. For
citizens’ positions we mainly use the European Social
Survey covering the period 2002–2012 (European Social
Survey, 2002–2016). More information on the develop-
ment of mass political positions over time in the 26
member states covered by this study can be found in
Supplementary File A. It should be noted that survey data
is missing for Malta and Croatia. All the mass surveys
have been weighted according to their population. For
elites’ positions, we use expert surveys: The Chapel Hill
Expert Survey (CHES; Bakker et al., 2015) and the expert
survey undertaken by Benoit and Laver (2006), as wewill
explain in more detail below.
Using these data sources, we focus on the left-right
dimension of political conflict. The left–right heuristic
is rooted in the French Revolution and summarizes di-
vergent policy positions, providing an organizing princi-
ple for party competition and voting behaviour; albeit
crude, the left–right dimension provides valuable infor-
mation about the match between the represented and
their representatives in terms of general ideological ori-
entation and is thus particularly useful for comparative
research (Lefkofridi, in press).When examining represen-
tation within the EU, however, there is also a second di-
mension of political contestation to consider, i.e., that
of pro-/contra European integration (Mair & Thomassen,
2010). Prior to the Eurozone crisis, it was mainly parties
on the fringes that mobilized voters on the EU dimen-
sion (de Vries, 2007); European issues did not play a ma-
jor role even in EP elections (Braun, Hutter, & Kerscher,
2016; Lefkofridi & Kritzinger, 2008). The salience of the
EU dimension for EU-level party competition and citi-
zens’ representation increased in 2014 (see Lefkofridi &
Katsanidou, 2018). For most of the years covered by our
study, therefore, the EU dimension was not as important
as the left–right dimension in European elections, and
even less important in national elections. Given that the
Council’s composition is the result of a series of national
elections, the present study thus does not analyze this
dimension. Besides, the EU question was not included in
the European Social Survey.
Our analysis necessitates a summary measure of
the Council’s position, and for this purpose we rely on
earlier work that uses a measure called the ‘Center of
Gravity’ (CoG; Gross & Sigelman, 1984;Manow&Döring,
2008). The CoG is an aggregated position of national cab-
inets. We calculate the CoG of the Council using infor-
mation from two sources: national government compo-
sitions from the Parlgov website and party position data
from expert surveys. We primarily used the CHES from
Bakker et al. (2015), which has the advantage of time-
variant party positions; in the case of Luxembourg,Malta,
Cyprus, and Croatia, however, as well as a few single par-
ties in other countries not covered by the CHES, we uti-
lized the Benoit and Laver (2006) expert survey instead.
While the position of each government is the weighted
average of all incumbent party positions, or in other
words the CoG of national cabinets (see Supplementary
File B for more information), the CoG of the Council is
an aggregation of all member states’ national govern-
ment positions. For the descriptive figures and the sub-
sequent regression analyses the data is presented in a
monthly format, since the Council is subject to change
when new national governments are formed. The posi-
tion of the EP was measured with the same kind of data
and is defined as the weighted average (by seats) of the
parties present in the EP (with party positions based on
data from CHES and Benoit and Laver [2006]). It can thus
vary both according to election periods and enlargement
rounds. This is relevant for the accession of Romania,
Bulgaria, and Cyprus.
Ideological congruence is calculated as the distance
between the left-right position of EU citizens belong-
ing to different income groups and the CoG of the
Council. As we are interested in the representation of
sub-constituencies of the population (poor and rich), we
have to measure congruence at individual level. Only in
this way can we distinguish between citizens with high
or low income. Individual congruence Cij is defined as
the absolute distance between the position of a citizen
P_citij and the CoG of the Council CoG_council, times
−1. The multiplication by −1 allows for an easier inter-
pretation of the results, as higher values indicate greater
congruence.
Cij = −|CoG_council − P_citij|
If the distance between a citizen and the govern-
ment/party decreases, Cij rises from negative values to-
wards 0 and ideological congruence increases. We use
this individual level congruencemeasure to analyse both
congruence across the EU as a whole and clustered in
their respective national constituencies.
In doing so we follow recent developments in the
study of congruence, especially the seminal work by
Golder and Stramski (2010), who use a similar measure
for studying national-level congruence. However, insofar
as we differmethodologically from earlier work on repre-
sentation in EU institutions, which has mainly used cross-
tabulations or factor models (e.g., Costello et al., 2012;
Thomassen & Schmitt, 1997), we cannot directly com-
pare our results to those findings.
The population is split into three income groups, as
is standard practice within this research field. Household
income has been adjusted to household size (see Rosset
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& Pontusson, 2014; Rueda & Pontusson, 2010). The two
lowest deciles of the income strata are classified as ‘poor’
while the two top deciles are classified as ‘rich.’
As a first step, we thus present graphically the devel-
opment of the ideological positions of our income groups
and compare them to the ideological leanings of both the
European Council and the EP. In a second stepwe regress
income groups’ positions on the CoG of the Council in a
multilevel setting.
4. Results
We begin with a comparative picture of income group
representation in the EP and the Council. Figure 1 shows
an aggregate picture of how the positions of the Council
and the EP evolved over time in the period 2000–2012
as compared to the positions of less and more affluent
citizens across the EU (the income groups of all member
states). In Figure 1 we see, first of all, that both the citi-
zens (poor and rich) and the institutions (the EP and the
Council) move around centrist (i.e., not extreme) posi-
tions, which is not surprising given that these are highly
aggregated measures that tend to be very centrist. We
also see that the poor are consistently positioned to the
left of both the rich and the EU institutions (the EP and
the Council). This indicates, in the first place, that the
potential for unequal representation exists, since poor
and rich citizens do not have identical preferences on
the left–right dimension. These findings also echo other
studies undertaken at national level in various European
states (e.g., Giger et al., 2012). A third observation con-
cerns the position of the rich as lying in-between the
poor and the EU institutions. While the Council is sys-
tematically located further to the right of the citizenry,
the EP overall seems to be more congruent with the cit-
izenry (poor and rich). The Council moved to the left
around 2007, which improved its congruence with the
citizenry (the poor, but even more so the rich), but sub-
sequently moved rightwards. The general picture, how-
ever, remains that the rich tend to be closer to both insti-
tutions’ positions than the poor, which indicates that the
representation of poorer citizens is worse than for those
with higher income shares. We can only speculate how
much these shifts are linked to the Great Recession, in
regard to which some scholars (e.g., Lindvall, 2014) pro-
pose that there was first a shift to the right followed by
a shift to the left.
Figure 2 focuses solely on the Council. Here we again
examine the Council’s representation of the poor and
the rich but this time with income groups disaggregated
into their respective national constituencies. Derived
from data in Table 1, in technical terms Figure 2 displays
the random slopes of the two individual-level predictors
(high and low income) by country. In substantive terms it
shows the degree of unequal representation of the poor
and rich strata of society compared to themiddle-income
category. Negative coefficients signify worse representa-
tion, while positive numbers signify a closer match be-
tween the preferences of a group and the Council. In
this figure we see that the poor are more likely to be un-
derrepresented across member states: In 18 countries
we see either a clear underrepresentation of their ideo-
logical preferences (e.g., in Cyprus and Romania) or no
big differences between the representation of their ide-
ological preferences and the preferences of the middle-
income category (e.g., in France), while in only seven
EU member states do the poor seem represented to a
degree commensurate with middle-income voters (e.g.,
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Figure 1. Congruence between the rich and poor and the EP and Council (across the EU).
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Figure 2. Unequal representation: Congruence of income groups across member states with the CoG of the Council.
in Denmark) or even, as in the case of Poland, better
represented. For the rich, by contrast, there is no clear
pattern. In other words, while the position of the Council
systematically differs from the poor in the majority of EU
member states, the CoG of the Council does not lead to
systematic overrepresentation of the rich.
Table 1. Multilevel regression of individual-level congru-
ence with the CoG of the Council.
Model 1
B S.E.
Low income −0.04 0.02 *
High income −0.02 0.03
Year −0.02 0.00 *
Constant 31.33 2.39 *
Random terms
Variance (countries) 0.24 0.03
Variance (individuals) 1.37 0.00
Variance (low income) 0.06 0.02
Variance (high income) 0.12 0.02
N (countries) 140316 (26)
Log Likelihood −243588
Note: * p < 0.5.
This picture is also visible in Table 1 (from which Figure 2
was produced), which shows the results of a multilevel
analysis (for a similar approach, see Giger et al., 2012).
It becomes evident that, while there is a statistically sig-
nificant underrepresentation of the poor in the Council,
there is no significant overrepresentation of the rich. In
substantive terms this means that the ideological posi-
tion of the poor is systematically neglected in the Council.
At the same time, however, there is no evidence from
this data that the ideological position of the wealthy is
overrepresented in this major EU-level institution.
5. Conclusions
Many centuries ago, Aristotle criticized democracy for
embodying the rule of the poor and oligarchy for serv-
ing only the wealthy. Although much ink has been spilt
on the EU’s democratic deficits, no study has inquired
into the unequal representation of income groups in
EU-level institutions. The EU’s complex system of mul-
tilevel transnational governance may be easier to navi-
gate for those who have the necessary resources to do
so, including knowledge and money for example, than
for thosewho do not. The poor’s unequal representation
at EU level could be due, amongst other things, to their
limited participation both in European elections that af-
fect the composition of the EP and in national-level elec-
tions that affect the composition of the Council. By fo-
cusing on specific income groups our study constitutes a
pioneering empirical examination of the ideological con-
gruence (left–right) of EU institutions (i.e., the EP and
the Council) with the publics for whom they make policy.
By examining unequal representation on the left–right
dimension of political conflict (both within the EU-wide
citizenry and within national-territorial constituencies),
our study also extends previous inquiries of representa-
tion on European integration in the Council (Hagemann
et al., 2017), aswell aswork on the Council’s political CoG
(Manow & Döring, 2008).
Does the EU system approximate more to a democ-
racy or an oligarchy in its representativeness of citizens?
While our research shows the EU is not an oligarchy that
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systematically over-represents the wealthy, nor does our
data reflect Aristotle’s fears about the poor dominating
in democracy. This conclusion is based on an examina-
tion of whether the EU Council and the EP, as the major
political decision-making institutions of the EU, exhibit
any bias towards a specific income group, i.e., the poor
or the rich. We found that both institutions tend to be
positioned to the right of both rich and poor citizens, al-
beit closer to the rich. We then looked more closely at
the Council, examining the income groups clustered in
member states. On the basis of this data analyzed here
we further found that while there is a systematic under-
representation of the poor in these EU institutions there
is no systematic overrepresentation of the rich. These
findings complement comparative studies that have fo-
cused on the national level of governance and demon-
strated a systematic underrepresentation of middle- and
low-income citizens both by party systems and govern-
ments in Europe (Giger et al., 2012; Rosset et al., 2013).
These findings have important implications for our
understanding of representation in themultilevel system
of the EU.While it seems impossible to adequately assess
the quality of democratic representation in EU member
states without taking into account the extent to which
citizens’ views and preferences are made present at EU
level, the literature has continued to neglect address-
ing the question of how specific social groups are repre-
sented by EU institutions (e.g., groups such as women,
see Kantola and Agustín, 2019, and the poor). With the
EU becoming increasingly influential in an ever-growing
number of policy areas, including the fiscal policies of its
member states, questions regarding the unequal repre-
sentation of specific social groups can no longer be disre-
garded by scholars of multi-level politics.
Against this background, the following two interre-
lated questions arise. First, to what extent do our find-
ings hold beyond the period of our investigation of 2000–
2012? In the last years covered by our study, the Coun-
cil’s CoG seemed to be moving further away from all
income groups, though its distance from the poor was
greater. It remains to be seen whether this picture has
deteriorated or improved in the intervening years, par-
ticularly given the austerity policies pursued across the
EU. Second, to what extent would the picture painted in
this study of broad ideological (left–right) preferences be
similar, better, or worse if we also looked at specific is-
sue dimensions? This question is pertinent given the in-
creasing politicization of the EU dimension of political
conflict that ensued from the Eurozone crisis that fol-
lowed the 2008 global financial crisis, themigration crisis
in the summer of 2015, and the Brexit saga that started in
the mid-2016, in addition to the larger issue of immigra-
tion. Earlier work has found that, in general, the quality
of representation is better in terms of left vs right ideo-
logical preferences, i.e., the main dimension of conflict
in European politics, but worse in terms of cultural and
European integration dimensions (Costello et al., 2012).
National-level research on representation and congru-
ence is moving towards the study of single-issue dimen-
sions (see, for example, Rasmussen, Reher, & Toshkov,
2019; Stecker & Tausendpfund, 2016) and some first at-
tempts have beenmade to study unequal representation
across issue-dimensions (e.g., Rosset & Stecker, 2019).
Future work on EU-level representation should thus also
go beyond the general left-right dimension to examine
the EU institutions’ congruence with income groups on
key policy issues of concern, such as European integra-
tion, immigration, and redistribution. Given recent work
suggesting that inequality is also apparent with regard to
the attention given to the priorities of less affluent citi-
zens (Traber, Hänni, Giger, & Breunig, 2019), future work
should examine the extent to which primary concerns of
poor EU citizens are equally or unequally considered by
and represented in EU-level institutions.
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